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In a forthcoming paper in IEE Proceedings Information Security, Feng Hao claims that temperature
inaccuracies make the key exchange scheme based on Kirchhoff Loop with Johnson-like Noise
insecure. First we point out that this claim is irrelevant for the security of the idealized/mathematical
communicator because it violates basic assumptions. Furthermore, in general practical applications,
as it has been pointed out in the very first paper, the use of thermal noise is disadvantageous
therefore the issue of temperature and its accuracy is unimportant even for the security of common
practical realizations. It is important to emphasize that any deviation from the idealized scheme can
lead to a finite level of security. Thus, if the above-mentioned author had stressed the inaccuracy of
the resistor values; his claim would have been practically valid. However the impact of such
systematic errors can be kept under control. Here we cite our relevant analysis (Phys. Lett. A 359,
(2006) 741-744) of 1% voltage inaccuracy along the line due to wire resistance effects, which can be
considered as a general result for inaccuracies of this order. The necessity to build a statistics to
extract information during the properly chosen clock time leads to extremely poor eavesdropper
statistics and this situation provides a good practical raw bit security that can be orders of magnitude
beyond the raw bit security of idealized quantum communicators.
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1. Feng Hao's comments
In a forthcoming paper [1], Feng Hao claims that temperature inaccuracy/difference at
the resistors in the Kirchhoff Loop Johnson-like Noise (KLJN) communicators [2-8]
compromises its security. Indeed, if we run the communicator with itself the Johnson
noise of the resistors (stealth communication [9]) and the temperature of one of the
resistors deviates from the temperature of the other resistors, there will be a net power
flow between the communicators (Alice and Bob), see Figure 1. As it was pointed out in
the first paper [2], non-zero net power flow between Alice and Bob compromises
security. In the present case, if the clock period were infinite, the situation when the
resistor with different temperature is connected to the line could be identified by the
measurement of the net power flow and its direction. Though the eavesdropper (Eve)
cannot identify the bit, high or low, she can identify this situation whenever it happens,
provided the temperature is fixed and the clock period is long enough. That means 50%
of the shared key or its inverse could be extracted. Similarly, with proper differences
between the temperatures of the other resistances, the whole secure key or its inverse
could be extracted by Eve provided the clock period is sufficiently long. After getting the
key or its inverse, Eve can test it and its inverse on the message and can decrypt the data.
                                                           
* In an email on October 29, 2006, the author of this paper asked the Editors in Chief of the IEE Proceedings
Information Security for an opportunity of publishing a response following directly Feng Hao's paper. However
the email answer (November 20, 2006) contained a negative response saying that such practice "is not the
custom in respected venues in cryptography".
†  Until 1999, L.B. Kiss
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Figure 1. The Kirchhoff Loop Johnson-like Noise (KLJN) setup. Feng Hao's comment is based on the
assumption that the voltage noise spectra Su(f) are different because the temperatures of the resistors are
different at practical (non-ideal) conditions. However, in practical cases, the voltage noise generators are not
thermal but external generators [2] with 1-100 million times greater voltages than the thermal noise therefore
the temperature has no relevance and Hao's comments are inappropriate.
In Section 2, we show several reasons why Feng Hao's comments [1] are irrelevant. In
Section 3, we show how these comments can be modified and be made partially relevant
for practical situations within the class of non-ideality problems of security. Finally, we
show the solution how to keep the practical security at any required level, beyond
quantum security. This is the very same method that was already described in the first
paper [2] and security data were published in [6].
2. Why are Feng Hao's comments irrelevant?
2.1. Irrelevance for the case of idealized (totally secure) KLJN communicators
It is important to emphasize that the comments [1] are irrelevant for the
idealized/mathematical KLJN key exchange scheme [2] because the comments [1] violate
the mathematical conditions assumed for total security. In the KLJN scheme it is assumed
that the temperatures or the spectra of voltage noise generators are equal and violating
that key assumption naturally leads to compromised security. It is like assuming that
quantum communicators requiring single photons for security cannot produce single
photons but only larger packages of photons, which is a valid practical problem at
quantum communication. Though all the practical quantum communicators suffer from
this deficiency compromising practical security, we do not say that the
idealized/mathematical quantum communicator schemes are insecure. Therefore, we
conclude that Feng Hao's comments violate basic assumptions thus they are irrelevant
for the theoretical KLJN scheme which remains totally secure.
2.2. Irrelevance for the case of practical KLJN communicators
From the very beginning [2], Johnson (-like) noise was used for the KLJN scheme and
the Johnson noise based considerations were used only for educational purpose, for the
sake of simplicity, because the well known statistical physical characteristics of Johnson
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noise make the total security of the idealized KLJN cipher obvious.
As it has been pointed out in the very first paper [2], at practical applications, the use
of thermal noise is disadvantageous (except stealth communication [9]) therefore the
issue of temperature and its accuracy is unimportant even for the security of common
practical realizations. In practical applications, the voltage noise generators are not
thermal but external voltage noise generators [2] with 1-100 million times greater RMS
noise voltage than the Johnson noise. Therefore the temperature has no relevance and
Feng Hao's comments are inappropriate for the practical KLJN realizations, too.
3. A valid practical case: inaccuracies as non-idealities and how to treat them
It is important to emphasize that any deviation from the idealized scheme of a physical
secure communication scheme can lead to a finite level of security. Relevant examples
for that are practical quantum communicators with the impossibility of generating strictly
ideal single photon packages or with the impossibility to avoid detector noise which also
compromise the quantum security. Thus, if the above-mentioned author had stressed the
inaccuracy of the resistor values, his claim would have been practically valid. However
the impact of such systematic errors can be kept under control in practical KLJN
realizations. Here we cite our relevant analysis [6] of 1% voltage inaccuracy (voltage
drop) along the line due to wire resistance effects. The results can be considered as
general result for the security leak at inaccuracies of this order (1%). The necessity to
build a statistics to extract information during the properly chosen clock time leads to
extremely poor eavesdropper statistics and this situation provides an excellent practical
raw bit security that can easily be beyond the raw bit security of idealized quantum
communicators.
Figure 2 shows the results of an analysis of the information leak due to systematic
errors/inaccuracies [6], with 1% relative effect, which is a significantly worse situation
than the 0.5% systematic temperature error supposed by Feng Hao [1]. In the case of
Feng Hao's supposed situation, Eve would need 4 times longer clock period to extract the
same amount of information as the analysis indicates below. Practical parameters and
noise rectifiers  have been assumed (see [6]). The noise bandwidth (correlation time) and
clock time period are selected so that Alice, Bob and Eve are able to extract only a few
independent samples during the clock period. Alice and Bob must decide between the
amplitude distributions f and g  on Figure 2 (a) and Eve must decide between the
amplitude distributions  f and g on Figure 2 (b) while they have a few random hits at the x
coordinates. It is obvious that Alice and Bob have an easy decision and Eve has a very
poor case. Still, the application of Shannon's channel code theorem indicates that, if Eve
finds out the best possible decoding method, she may be able to extract about 0.7% of the
exchanged bits. However this raw bit leak is still better than raw bit leaks in idealized
quantum communicators (see [6]).
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Figure 2. Analysis of the information leak due to systematic errors/inaccuracies [6], with 1% relative effect,
which is a significantly worse situation than the 0.5% systematic error supposed by Hao. In the case of Hao's
situation, Eve would need a 4 times longer clock time period to reach the same situation as indicated by these
amplitude density functions.
Finally we note that 1% inaccuracy is an "economical" one and, if higher raw bit security
is needed, the accuracy can be improved with sufficient resources. For example, a 10
times increase of the wire diameter decreases the 1% inaccuracy (voltage drop) in [6] to
0.01% which would make the curves f and g in Figure 2 (b) indistinguishable by the
naked eye and decrease the bit leak to 0.00007% which is a raw bit leak /security much
beyond the reach of any quantum communicator.
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